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Apostasy as an object of sociological inquiry has traditionally been marginalised 
and under-theorised. Within the sociology of religion, apostasy is often treated as an 
area of sub-specialisation under the umbrella of empirical religious investigation. 
Research is often approached in a topical and discrete manner with minimal 
theoretical underpinnings. While secularisation theory may be called upon as an 
explanation for recent increases in J;ates of disaffiliation, apostasy is still perceived 
and examined as a social-psychological phenomenon, unable to contribute to 
fundamental macro knowledges of religion and society. It is thus a topic of 
investigation not well pursued or informed by social theory. Further, I argue that 
apostasy is often premised on a set of uncritically reflected modernist assumptions 
that leave the construct marginalised and . outside current theoretical discourses of 
the postmodem. 
I believe that this marginalisation is problematic. Apostasy, understood and 
examined solely as an individual's experience of religious disaffiliation; does not 
allow the construct to be used as a tool capable of asking and answering fundamental 
sociological questions. It does not allow apostasy to be a window that can shed light 
on processes and techniques of socialisation that shape and form the individual. It 
does not attempt to understand the agency of the individual in negotiating the 
constructed self. Nor do these bounded approaches allow for a fresh examination of 
religion and religiosity, as both understandings of these constructs, and the constructs 
themselves evolve and reflect a postmodem world. 
In a suitable analytical framework, however, I argue that the construct of 
apostasy can act as a vital signifier of the ever shifting relationship between the self, 
religiosity and societal structures. I believe that apostasy can signify the ability of, 
and need for, understandings of both the self and society to restructure and transform 
themselves in times of societal transformation. Further, I believe apostatic research 
conducted in a period of transition can point to the fluid nature of religion, as it 
evolves to reflect the developing social arena and the predominant discourses of 
knowledge. I believe apostasy can be instrumental in illuminating a potential epistemic 
shift occurring commensurate with the emergence of a postmodem world. 
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The Durkheimian Influence on Apostasy Research 
Durkheim's contribution to contemporary understandings of religion has been 
highly influential for apostatic research. Durkheim viewed religion as ' ... a body of 
collective beliefs and practices endowed with a certain authority ... (1973 :51). 
Durkheim saw religion, not as a transcendent force, but as a cultural phenomenon; 
one embedded within, created by, and essential to society. He saw religion as 
instrumental to mechanical solidarity, and as perhaps the most fundamental element 
of a collective conscious. For Durkheim, religion is both functional and necessary. 
The maintenance of the society and the well being of the individual both rely on the 
solidarity built on the rites and rituals of religion. He states: 
By the mere fact that their (religions') apparent function is to strengthen the 
bonds attaching the believer to his God, they at the same time really strengthen 
the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member, since 
the God is only a figurative expression of the society. (1965:257) 
Religion in fact, can be seen as a reflection of the utter dependence of the 
individual on society. There is acceptance of symbiotic relationships between religion 
and society/ religiosity and the individual. 
These Durkheimian understandings of religion as necessary and utilitarian, 
are particularly influential in shaping apostasy know ledges. Accordingly, the literature 
proceeds from a premise of religion as essential and functional, and apostasy as 
dysfunctional and aberration. Thus, quite consistently, and often without explicit 
recognition, the underlying assumption of disaffiliation research is that apostasy is 
detrimental. In fact, a review of the literature claims that apostasy is, a 'falling from 
faith' (Brinkerhoff and Burke, 1980); a manifestation of 'guilt and shame' (Mauss, 
1969); a product of 'maladjustment or neurosis' (Caplovitz and Sherrow, 1977); a 
'disenchantment' (Roof, 1978); a 'failure' of socialisation and inter-generational 
transmission (Hunsberger, 1983); and a 'detrimental rejection' (Condran and Tamney, 
1985). More than objective findings, however, I argue that these negative orientations 
exist as an implicit operating paradigm which biases the work. This can be clearly 
evidenced by Robert Heiner's 1992 article. His study of the attitudes of the members 
of the Freedom from Religion Foundation is entitled, 'Evangelical Heathens: The 
Status ofFreethinkers in Southland'. It is published in the journal, Deviant Behaviour. 
This quite obviously points to negative subjectivities surrounding issues of non-
belief. Durkheim's work on anomie has also contributed to negatively biased 
knowledges of apostasy. Durkheim claimed that anomie is likely to develop when 
' .. .individual passions (are left) without a curb to regulate them' (1993:287). For 
Durkheim, religion was one means for keeping such 'individual passions' in check. 
This belief can be evidenced in the operating paradigms of contemporary religious 
research in which a negative correlation between religious disaffiliation and anomie 
is taken for granted. McGuire presents this assumed relationship well: 
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Religion's capability of providing meaning and order suggest that religion 
functions as a protection from anomie in two ways: A firm religious basis of 
order is a buffer against the occurrence of anomie in the first place; and if the 
group does experience an anomie situation, religion can potently respond to the 
crisis of moral meanings (1987, 30). 
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Accordingly, research hypotheses that use anomie as a theoretical construct 
centre on the negative correlation of anomie and the strength of one's religious 
affiliation. Many researchers have in fact, found some support for this claim. Lee 
and Clyde (1974:35) find that: 1) religion has an immediate negative impact on 
anomie; and that 2) religiosity can inhibit the effects of alternate factors which 
could otherwise produce anomie. Lee ( 1981) found that while religious consciousness 
is not found to be significantly correlated, church attendance does have a weak 
negative correlation to anomie. More recently, Heiner (1992) round that 'freethinkers' 
or atheists are more likely than theists to experience alienation and anomie, and feel 
less connected to society at large. 
Equally interesting, however, is the plethora of research, still premised on the 
negative correlation of anomie and religiosity, which does not bear out this hypothesis. 
For example, Fay (1978), contrary to hypothesis, found that within a religious 
community anomie was more likely to be concentrated among those most orthodox 
in their religiosity, specifically amongst those who are authoritarian, traditionalistic 
and nonrational. Seubert (1985), again contrary to hypothesis, found no significant 
relationship between anomie and orthodox religious belief. Seubert goes on to describe 
the problems this causes for interpretation. Christiano (1986)hypothesised that those 
individuals with incomplete family ties resort to religious participation as a means 
of relieving anomie. Support for this hypothesis was not found. Willits and Funk's 
research (1989) actually went on to find a correlation between the acceptance of 
non"traditional beliefs about God and lower expressions of anomie. Finally, Kanga, 
Willits and Cruder (1990), found that the more traditional the religious beliefs, the 
greater the expressed anomie. 
The relationship of anomie to religiosity is thus shown to be complex, and can 
not be handled linearly. Anomie needs to be seen as having a rich nexus of 
relationships to both religious socialisation and religious disaffiliation. Studies of 
anomie, however, which are premised upon un-critically engaged Durkheimian 
notions of religion, have difficulty capturing the complexity of the situation for both 
individuals and society, as they negotiate an emerging postmodern world; a world 
not imagined or predicted by Durkheim. 
As we move from a modern to a postmodern condition it becomes essential to 
historically situate the operating paradigms central to apostatic research. Durkheim 
needs to be reflected-upon as a modernists theorist who was interested in the rupture 
of traditional social ties by industrialisation, the Enlightenment and individualism. 
Rather than the death of religion, Durkheim was concerned with the demise of the 
beliefs and practices of premodern forms of religion as they had their authority 
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threatened in modernity. Durkheim's concern was over the alienating effects of 
transitions through modernity in which he sees the collective conscious in an 
unresolved state of flux. He was concerned with the ' .. .incertitude and confused 
agitation .. .' (1965: 474) he sees as a potential of high modernity. His theorisations, 
however, did not reach in to a postmodem world. Thus, when Durkheim speaks of 
the plight of religion and the impact of change he is referring to a time when, 
... societies become more voluminous and expand over vaster territories, 
traditions and practices, in order to accommodate themselves to the diversity of 
situations and to the mobility of circumstances, are obliged to maintain 
themselves in a state of plasticity and inconstancy which no longer offers enough 
resistance to individual variations. These variations, being less well restrained, 
are produced more freely and multiply; that is to say everyone tends to go off in 
his own direction. At the same time, as a result of a more developed division of 
labour, each mind finds itself oriented to a different point of the horizon, 
reflecting a different aspect of the world, and consequently the contents of 
consciousness (conscience) differs from one person to the other. Thus we make 
our way, little by little to a state, nearly achieved as of now, where the members 
of a single social group will have nothing in common among themselves except 
their humanity (1973: 51). 
In other words, Durkheim is referring to a conception of the future which he 
sees offered by capitalism and industrialisation; the projected site of high modernity. 
Durkheim's theories, however, have been taken from their historical setting of 
modernity and non-critically applied to a world emerging on a postmodem age. The 
possibilities and complexities of renegotiating faith in a postmodem world are 
generally not taken into account by theorists who uncritically rely on modem 
understandings of religion. Thus for theorists who continue to uncritically apply the 
work of Durkheim to contemporary know ledges of apostasy, the complexities of 
understanding the significance of re-negotiating faith are not drawn out. 
As we negotiate the passage from a modem to postinodem world, the 
applicability of Durkheim's theorisations must be put under examination. Certainly, 
I believe that many of Durkheim's conceptions reflect important and fundamental 
aspects of our contemporary situation. Societies have expanded, mechanical solidarity 
has given way to organic solidarity, and there has been a weakening of the collective 
conscious. I would thus argue that many of the alienating aspects of modernity 
described by Durkheim still impact on the individual. Durkheim's insights on the 
emotive toll, or the anomie and egoism associated with modernity are still 
instrumental for understanding aspects of the contemporary individual, hence 
contemporary apostate. This thesis, in fact, is premised on the viability of these 
Durkheimian conceptions of anomie and egoism as develop'ed in his work Suicide 
(1993). 
In Suicide, Durkheim proposed that the breakdown of a traditionally based 
collective conscious will cause great and overriding feelings of angst. This can lead 
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to a state of anomie which ' ... begets a state of exasperated and irritated weariness ... ' 
(1993:375). He goes on to say that anomie, ' .. .is anger and all the emotions 
customarily associated with disappointment' (1993:284), and that '(t)he dominating 
tone is more or less irritated disgust with life (1993:286). 
Where the angst of modernity manifests itself as egoism, it is likely to show 
itself as 
' ... a condition of melancholic langour which relaxes all the springs of action 
(and) inspires the person only with indifference and aversion ... what is lost in 
activity is made up for in thought and inner life. In revulsion from its 
surroundings consciousness becomes self occupied (1993: 278-9). 
In other words, egoism and anomie will be a consequence of modern society, 
wherein individuals are left with the 'infinity of dreams' and/or the 'infinity of 
desires'(287), that may lead to suicide. I believe this is analogous for the case of 
apostasy. Modernity, and its impact on traditional structures of religiosity, have created 
anomie and egoistic forms of apostasy. Individuals do not feel connected to traditional 
familial faith, reacting with either confused agitation or melancholic introspection. 
In contrast, however, applying altruistic suicide, a traditional or pre-modern 
form of suicide based on obligation to the contemporary situation of apostasy is 
more difficult. ' ... (S)erene conviction derived from the feeling of duty' (283), does 
little to explain the foregoing of faith in a world where the ties to religion are no 
longer central to the infrastructure of society. In a 'secularised' modern world, 
moving towards a postmodern condition, apostasy is not generally a 'cause'. Altruistic 
resistance does not find applicability to the current situation. 
As we move from the site of high modernity as predicted by Durkheim, to that 
of a postmodern world, we find that our understandings of religion, hence apostasy 
need to shift accordingly. Durkheim, for example, firmly believed that religion as 
the misplaced worship of society, must necessarily continue. He theorised that a 
religion of humanity must eventuate: 
' ... [a] day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative 
effervescence, in the course of which new ideas and new formulae are found 
which serve for a while as a guide to humanity' (1965:475). 
These understandings of religion, however, are based on predicted sites of 
high modernity. Durkheim's narrative regarding civil religion and an eventuating 
religion of humanity may hint at one possibility for re-imagining religion in a 
postmodern world. I argue, however, that these Durkheimian conceptions do not 
allow for significant meaning and protection from anomie and egoism to be derived 
from a plethora of sources, both religious and secular, in postmodernity. 
I further argue that his thesis also constrains the agency of the individual. 
There is little room for the active negotiation of faith. For Durkheim, religiosity will 
be likely to be directed by a national level of symbolism until a religion of humanity 
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is attained. The Durkheimian school of thought does not allow for religiosity in a 
world where individuals can negotiate meaning at diverse and varied sites. It does 
not allow for the possibility for the development of more than one collective conscious, 
as might be possible in a postmodem world. Nor does it allow for negotiated and 
reformulated religiosity to operate in a society devoid of a unified mechanical 
solidarity. Thus, as we shift along the time line, there is a need to recognise the 
limitations of Durkheimian conceptions of religion. 
Accordingly, I argue that in addition to anomie and egoistic apostates, there is 
the need to create a new category of apostate; the postmodem apostate. This class of 
apostate is one who better reflects the postmodem condition. This apostate type is 
open to the possibilities and potentialities of the postmodem world, and is not subject 
to angst produced by a society devoid of a singular source of solidarity. These apostates 
are able to negotiate a societal condition, where unlike the one predicted by Durkheim, 
there are options for faith, meaning and solidarity. Religion and religiosity are open 
for negotiation, in a world where meaning need not be located globally, and apostasy 
is not axiomatically seen as aberrant. 
Assuming that pluralism, privitisation, rationalism and breaking away from 
the 'collective conscious' of our immediate socialising influences are negative 
properties, does not allow for recognition of the positive or emancipatory capabilities 
of the process. Nor does it allow for a possible state of society in which breaks with 
tradition are not necessarily indicative of social breakdown; it does not allow for a 
society in which breaks with tradition are indicative. of new and evolving 
epistemological orientations to knowledge. Choice, freedom, and the positive aspects 
of the ability to choose one's own destiny, are all down played, due to operating 
paradigms not reflective of the contemporary situation. 
The contemporary· situation needs to be seen as one of transition,. With this 
recognition apostasy can be used to reflect a variety of responses to this level of 
societal change. Whether apostasy is a response to secularisation in a modem world 
that leaves individuals without faith, or whether it is a rejection of modernity's 
construction of religion, may be dependent upon the individual's relationship to a 
postmodem world. Apostasy needs to be seen as having a complex set of relationships 
to both religiosity and the self. The is particularly relevant as societies begin to 
negotiate a world no longer embedded in the discursive processes of modernity. 
Towards a Foucauldian Approach to Apostasy Research 
The question then, becomes how apostasy can be re-imagined and re-theorised 
so that it represents .the complexity of the current situation. To answer this question, 
I'd like to tum to Michel Foucault. Foucault did not specifically address apostasy, or 
even secularisation and religion. Nonetheless, I believe that his studies of the subject 
can be highly insightful for apostatic research. 
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The Modern 
Foucault was a post-structuralist whose investigations can be seen as a critical 
reflection on the difference between pre-modem and modem cultural forms. Thus, 
as was the case for Durkheim, modernity is a central focus of his work. Rather than 
simply describing the effects of modernity, however, Foucault's interest was in the 
historical conditions which made possible the modem subject. For Foucault, one 
central and defining aspect of modernity is the power relations or techniques of 
power which create and constrain the modem individual. He is interested in how the 
modem subject is made, and how the making of the subject is linked to power. 
Foucault states: 
.. .in a society such as ours ... there are manifold relations of power which 
permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, ... there can be no possible 
exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operate 
through and on the basis of association. We are subjected to the production of 
truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production 
of truth (1980:93). 
Foucault's analysis of the power relations operating in modernity can thus be 
seen as instrumental for understanding the techniques of socialisation which created 
the modem religious self. Truth and power conspire to create an undeniable reality 
for the individual which can be highly constraining. This would be particularly true 
when the 'religious' is embedded within power relations. As Foucault states: 
... a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who 
are affected by it don't have the means for modifying it. This can happen when 
such a system becomes intangible as a result of its being considered a moral or 
religious imperative ... (1989:21). 
Nevertheless, Foucault recognises that even this particular landscape can be 
resisted; ' ... in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance' 
(1990: 12). There are always ways to redefine power relationships and to resist 
domination, even if the cost is high. Thus, Foucault's theories can be useful for 
understanding the emotive toll of certain forms of apostasy. In fact, I would argue 
that in a Foucauldian framework, anomie and egoism might be seen as natural by-
products of resistance to dominating power relations which define religion in 
modernity. 
Apostasy can thus be understood as a site of resistance to the 'grid of material 
coercions' (1980:104), and the dominating power relations endemic to religion in 
modernity. The nature of these dominating relationships, however, may constrain 
the individual from negotiating belief. Religious abandonment through the anomie 
response of anger, or through egoistic examination of religion, society and the self, 
may leave the individual without faith. Vann makes the point: 'Lacking an adequate 
analysis and critique of modernity, worshippers' discontent in response to oppression 
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becomes focused on worship itself' (1994:1). Foucault is explicit his recognition of 
hidden frameworks. He states that the creation of the subject is embedded within 
particular historical parameters: 
It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their 
landscape - that people think are universal - are the result of some very precise 
historical changes, all my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities 
in human existence (1988:11). 
The Postmodern 
In the Foucauldian tradition then, traditional understandings of religion and 
apostasy would be recognised as constructs of modernity, which can, in fact be 
deconstructed andre-imagined. Modernity is recognised as a point in a never-ending 
historical change, one in which 'technologies ofthe self' (1988:18), used to control 
and shape the subject can be transformed into more productive means for negotiating 
the self. These conceptions allow for both transforming individuals and the possibility 
of a new form of society in which 'technologies of the self' (1988:18) no longer need 
to be punitive and restrictive. Rather, in a society such as the one offered by 
postrnodernity, there may exist new means for changing the self. Foucault's analysis 
is therefore helpful for understanding the agency of the individual in initiating change, 
and for understanding a potential form of society which allows for the exploration of 
new orientations to knowledge. 
Following this argument, Foucault's analysis would allow for a new breed of 
apostate free from modernity's angst. Foucault's recognition of shifting and evolving 
historical periods allows for subjects whose relationships to religion and spirituality 
need no longer be based on the dominating power relations of the modem era. This 
new breed of apostate may reflect a societal condition in which complete and punitive 
domination no longer defines 'power'. Foucault's theories are thus important for 
understanding the development of the postmodern apostate and the significance of 
this new category for illuminating epistemic change. 
Where to from here 
This paper argues that all definitions and understandings of religion, hence 
apostasy, are embedded in historical conditions and party to discursive processes. 
Based on a set of now untenable presuppositions, these discursive processes have 
shaped apostasy literature. From broad 'universal' knowledges of religion accepted 
as given, to conceptions of society which are historically stagnant, to subjective 
positioning which prioritises the functional aspects of religiosity, understandings of 
apostasy must be seen as the product of discursive processes; processes which have 
not allowed for: 1) the emotive complexity of disaffiliation in a period of transition; 
2) the agency of the individual for negotiating and creating new postrnodem forms 
of religiosity and 3) a postrnodem condition which redefines relationships between 
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the self and religiosity. With the shift from modernity to postmodernity, it is necessary 
that our thinking and knowledges allow for and reflect continued transformations 
on the part of religion, society and the individual. 
The traditional emphasis on what religion is, may thus be substantially 
augmented by postmodernist examinations of how it is that religion evolves and 
reflects, and is reflected by the social situation. I argue that a site capable of being, 
but not yet employed as, a signifier of both the shifting nature of society and the 
ability of the individual to negotiate the religious is a postmodernist examination of 
the processes of apostasy. I believe it is a site that allows us to: 
... ask instead, how things work at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted 
processes ... we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, 
progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of 
organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to 
grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. (Foucault, 
1980:97). 
Apostasy can be used as a window to such processes. Rather than limiting 
examinations of apostates to description and correlation, we can begin to explore 
how it is that religious subjects are constituted by modern society, and how this 
constitution may be resisted. We can also begin to explore postmodernity and the 
impact this new form of society has on the constitution of the postmodern subject. 
Apostasy under these circumstances can now be explored as representative of new 
epistemological approaches to knowledge, no longer a process of resistance, but 
perhaps processes of reflection and transformation of the self, now possible in 
postmodernity. 
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